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Abstract
The frontal lobes subserve decision-making and executive control—that is, the selection and coordination of goal-directed
behaviors. Current models of frontal executive function, however, do not explain human decision-making in everyday
environments featuring uncertain, changing, and especially open-ended situations. Here, we propose a computational
model of human executive function that clarifies this issue. Using behavioral experiments, we show that unlike others, the
proposed model predicts human decisions and their variations across individuals in naturalistic situations. The model
reveals that for driving action, the human frontal function monitors up to three/four concurrent behavioral strategies and
infers online their ability to predict action outcomes: whenever one appears more reliable than unreliable, this strategy is
chosen to guide the selection and learning of actions that maximize rewards. Otherwise, a new behavioral strategy is
tentatively formed, partly from those stored in long-term memory, then probed, and if competitive confirmed to
subsequently drive action. Thus, the human executive function has a monitoring capacity limited to three or four behavioral
strategies. This limitation is compensated by the binary structure of executive control that in ambiguous and unknown
situations promotes the exploration and creation of new behavioral strategies. The results support a model of human
frontal function that integrates reasoning, learning, and creative abilities in the service of decision-making and adaptive
behavior.
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Introduction
The ability to adapt to uncertain, changing, and open-ended
environments is a hallmark of human intelligence. In such natural
situations, decision-making involves exploring, adjusting, and
exploiting multiple behavioral strategies (i.e., flexible mappings
associating stimuli, actions, and expected outcomes [1–4]). This
faculty engages the frontal lobe function that manages task sets—
that is, active representations of behavioral strategies stored in
long-term memory—for driving action [5–10]. According to
reinforcement learning (RL) models [11,12], the task set driving
ongoing behavior (referred to as the actor) is adjusted according to
outcome values for maximizing action utility. Uncertainty
monitoring (UM) models [13,14] further indicate that the frontal
executive function infers online the actor reliability—that is, its
ability to infer action outcomes—for resetting the actor whenever
it becomes unreliable. Moreover, models combining RL and UM
suggest that given a fixed collection of concurrent task sets, the
frontal function monitors in parallel their relative reliability for
adjusting and choosing the most reliable actor [15–17].
These models, however, do not explain how the frontal
executive function controls an expanding repertoire of behavioral
strategies for acting in changing and open-ended environments:
that is, how this function decides to create new strategies rather
than simply adjusting and switching between previously learned
ones. For example, imagine you want to sell lottery tickets to
people. After a few trials, you have certainly learned a strategy that
appears to be successful for selling your tickets, but your strategy
then starts to fail with the next person. You then decide to switch
to a new strategy. After adjusting to the new strategy and several
successful trials, the new strategy fails again. You may then decide
to return to your first strategy or test an entirely new one, and so
on. After many trials you have probably learned many different
strategies and switch across them and possibly continue to invent
new ones. Moreover, among this large collection of behavioral
strategies, you may have further learned that several are
appropriate with young people, others with older people, some
with those wearing hats, others with those holding an umbrella,
and so on. How do we learn and manage such an expanding
collection of behavioral strategies and decide to create new ones
rather than simply adjusting and switching between previously
learned ones, possibly according to environmental cues? More
formally, little is known about how the frontal executive function
continuously arbitrates between (1) adjusting and staying with the
current actor set, (2) switching to other learned task sets, and (3)
creating new task sets for driving action. This issue raises a
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 1 March 2012 | Volume 10 | Issue 3 | e1001293computational problem that statistical learning models based on
Dirichlet process mixtures address [18–20]. However, it remains
unclear how the frontal executive function may implement such
statistical models, because they critically rely on off-line Bayesian
inferences operating on expanding collections of sets that rapidly
become computationally intractable [21]. Thus, a fundamental
issue is to understand how with limited monitoring resources the
human executive function controls online the creation of new
behavioral strategies and consequently manages an expanding
collection of behavioral strategies for driving action.
To clarify this issue, we proposed a computational model of the
frontal executive function that controls the creation, learning,
storage, retrieval, and selection of behavioral strategies driving
action. The model constitutes a biologically plausible, online
algorithm. The algorithm approximates Dirichlet process mixtures
[19] by combining reinforcement learning, limited Bayesian
inferences, and hypothesis testing for arbitrating between adjusting,
switching, and creating actor task sets. Consistent with the capacity
limit of human working memory [22–24], the model assumes that
the frontal executive function forms and monitors in parallel only a
limited number of concurrent task sets: the executive function
monitors only a small part of behavioral strategies stored in long-
term memory [22,23,25]. As previously suggested [15–17], task set
reliability is inferred online for choosing the actor sets that drive
behavior and adjust to external contingencies. The key assumption
is that new task sets are tentatively created and probed as actors
whenever no current task sets appear to be reliable. Such probe
actors are partly formed by recombining the strategies stored in
long-term memory according to external cues [22,23,25]. Probe
task sets adjust to external contingencies, but may be subsequently
discarded when they ultimately appear unnecessary. In the converse
case, task set collection is updated with probe task sets: in case the
monitoring capacity would be reached, the least recently used task
setsarediscardedbutthe associatedstrategiesremainstoredinlong-
term memory. Thus, with limited computing resources, the
executive function manages an expanding repertoire of behavioral
strategies and controls the selection, learning, retrieval, and creation
of behavioral strategies that drive action.
We provided a proper computational formulation of this model,
named the PROBE model. We tested the model predictions in
behavioral experiments inspired from the standard neuropsycho-
logical test of frontal executive function,namelythe WisconsinCard
Sorting Test [26,27]. We compared the PROBE model to
alternative models, ruling out successively key model assumptions:
the notion of hypothesis-testing on task set creation (MAX model),
that of task set creation (FORGET model, which encompasses
existing models), and the notion of task set monitoring (RL models).
We found that unlike these alternative models, the PROBE model
predicts human decisions and their variations across individuals.
Moreover, the PROBE model that best fits human data is endowed
with a monitoring capacity of three or four task sets.
Results
Standard Model Assumptions
We assumed that task sets represent behavioral strategies stored
in long-term memory. Each behavioral strategy consists of a selective
mapping encoding stimulus-response associations, a predictive
mapping encoding expected action outcomes given stimuli [13–
15], and a contextual mapping encoding external cues predicting task
set reliability (see Figure S1 and Materials and Methods).
The executive function builds and monitors at most N task sets,
a bound reflecting the capacity limit of human working memory
[22–24]. Consistent with previous studies [13–15], task set
reliability is evaluated online through forward Bayesian inference:
the reliability is inferred before acting according to the perceived
volatility of external contingencies [14] and the occurrence of
external cues (given contextual mappings) for choosing the actor
driving immediate behavior (see below). The actor selective
mapping then determines the response to stimulus using a softmax
policy (inverse temperature b and noise e) [11,15,28]. Thus, we
assumed that in agreement with previous studies (e.g., [6,29,30]),
selection happens at the level of task sets first, then at the level of
actions within task sets.
After action, selective mappings then adjust according to
outcome values through standard reinforcement learning (learning
rate as) [11,31], while predictive mappings update outcome
predictions [13]. Task set reliability is also updated according to
action outcomes (given predictive mappings) and serves to adjust
contextual mappings through a classical stochastic gradient
descent (contextual learning rate ac). Contextual mappings thus
learn the external cues predicting actual reliability (referred to as
contextual cues for clarity).
PROBE Model
The PROBE model assumes that external contingencies are
variable and generated from distinct external states. External states
are potentially infinite and not directly observable, thereby
reflecting variable, uncertain, and open-ended environments.
The PROBE model then builds task sets as instances of external
hidden states for appropriately driving behavior according to
inferred external states. The reliability of every task set then
measures the likelihood that the task set matches current external
states given all observable events (contextual cues and the history
of action outcomes). For inferring online the opportunity to create
new task sets, the PROBE model evaluates task set ‘‘absolute’’
reliability; by concurrently monitoring the reliability of ‘‘random
behavior,’’ the PROBE model estimates online the likelihood that
no task sets match current external states and, consequently, the
reliability of every task set conditional upon the history of action
outcomes (and contextual cues) but not upon the collection of
current task sets (see Materials and Methods).
Consequently, when a task set appears to be reliable (i.e., more
likely reliable than unreliable), it becomes the actor (i.e., the
exclusive action selector) because no others meet this criterion.
Author Summary
Reasoning, learning, and creativity are hallmarks of human
intelligence. These abilities involve the frontal lobe of the
brain, but it remains unclear how the frontal lobes function
in uncertain or open-ended situations. We propose here a
computational model of human executive function that
integrates multiple processes during decision-making,
such as expectedness of uncertainty, task switching, and
reinforcement learning. The model was tested in behav-
ioral experiments and accounts for human decisions and
their variations across individuals. The model reveals that
executive function is capable of monitoring three or four
concurrent behavioral strategies and infers online strate-
gies’ ability to predict action outcomes. If one strategy
appears to reliably predict action outcomes, then it is
chosen and possibly adjusted; otherwise a new strategy is
tentatively formed, probed, and chosen instead. Thus,
human frontal function has a monitoring capacity limited
to three or four behavioral strategies. The results support a
model of frontal executive function that explains the role
and limitations of human reasoning, learning, and creative
abilities in decision-making and adaptive behavior.
Frontal Lobe Function and Human Decision-Making
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set is created and probed as the actor. This actor initially consists
of new selective/predictive mappings, which are formed from
mixing selective/predictive mappings stored in long-term memory
and weighted according to contextual cues (given contextual
mappings) [22,23,25]. The mixture is prone to noise scaled by
parameter g named recollection entropy (0#g#1). Endowed with
prior reliability minimizing prior information [32], the probe actor
is initially unreliable, but its selective/predictive mapping adjusts
to external contingencies: when it becomes reliable, while the
other task set remains unreliable, task set creation is ‘‘confirmed’’;
task set collection is updated by possibly discarding the least recent
actor set in case the capacity limit would be reached. When
conversely another task set becomes reliable before the probe
actor, the latter is discarded and the former becomes the actor.
Thus, the PROBE model is an online, forward approximation of
Dirichlet process mixtures [19] based on hypothesis testing on task
set creation (i.e., on the critical no-parametric component of
Dirichlet processes) (see Text S1).
In the PROBE model, unselected task sets are inferred as being
unreliable (i.e., unrelated to current external states). The PROBE
model therefore assumes that unlike multiple actor models [15–
17], no learning occurs in selective and predictive mappings within
unselected task sets. Thus, only selective/predictive mappings of
actor task sets are adjusted according to action outcomes. This
assumption is consistent with empirical evidence that in task
switching, task set selection inhibits internal mappings of
unselected task sets (e.g., [6,29,30]).
Overall, the PROBE model has six free parameters. Standard
free parameters are: inverse temperature b scaling greediness in
action selection, noise e scaling lapses probability in action
selection, and learning rates as and ac scaling updating rates of
selective and contextual mappings. Additionally, we treated
bounds N and recollection entropy g as free parameters for
investigating multiple theoretical schemes. We also considered two
additional free parameters capturing possible human biases
(Materials and Methods): context-sensitivity bias d.0 increasing
transiently the perceived volatility of external contingencies (i.e.,
the tendency to switch actors whenever, besides stimuli, additional
external cues change between two successive trials) and confirmation
bias h enhancing prior reliability of newly formed task sets, thereby
restraining their immediate disengagement.
Alternative Models
The MAX model is identical to the PROBE model, except that
it removes the notion of hypothesis testing for creating task sets.
New task sets are created for acting only when no task sets appear
more reliable than ‘‘random behavior’’ (i.e., when it becomes more
likely that no task sets match current external states) (see Text S1).
Endowed with prior reliability corresponding to random behavior,
new task sets therefore appear initially as the most reliable ones, so
that task set creation is automatically confirmed. Thus, the most
reliable task set is the actor, provided that it remains more reliable
than random behavior. The MAX model creates new task sets only
when no current task sets are more reliable than chance, whereas
the PROBE creates new task sets once no current task sets appear
to be reliable. Conversely, the MAX model keeps new task sets in
the monitoring buffer when there are no more actors, whereas the
PROBE model keeps them provided that they have been reliable.
The MAX model corresponds to the one-particle filtering
approximation of Dirichlet process mixtures [21]. Otherwise, the
MAX and PROBE models are identical and have the same free
parameters.
The FORGET model further removes the notion of task set
creation (Text S1). The actor is chosen using a softmax policy
(inverse temperature b9) for possibly recycling task sets. Concom-
itantly, the strategies associated with unused task sets decay into
the random strategy (decay rate Q,0 ,Q,1) [33,34], so that
unused task sets may be recycled as ‘‘new’’ task sets. Thus, the
collection of task sets is fixed and corresponds to monitoring
capacity N. As external states are potentially infinite, task set
reliability therefore represents relative evidence across distinct
behavioral strategies rather than external states. The FORGET
model therefore assumes that as in multiple actor models [15–17]
selective/predictive mappings are adjusted concurrently in every
task set in proportion to task set reliability. For consistency with
both the PROBE and MAX models, we also tested the FORGET
model with the assumption that learning occurs only for actor task
sets. In the present study, the two assumptions actually yield to
virtually the same predictions, so we ignore the distinction
henceforth.
The FORGET model encompasses existing models: basic RL
models when bound N=1 [11,12], UM models when N=2 and
decay rate Q is large relative to external volatility [13,14], and
finally, multiple actor models combining RL and UM when N.1
and Q=0 [15–17]. The FORGET model has the same free
parameters as the MAX and PROBE models, except that decay
rate Q and inverse temperature b9 replace recollection entropy and
confirmation bias, respectively.
Human Decisions With No Contextual Cues
We conducted the first experiment with 22 participants who
responded to successive visual stimuli (three possible digits) by
pressing one among four response buttons (see Figure S2A and
Materials and Methods). For each stimulus, one response led to a
positive outcome with a probability of 90% (audiovisual feedbacks
associated with extra monetary payoff), while the others led to a
positive outcome with a probability of 10% only. Unbeknownst to
the participants, the mapping between stimuli and best responses
shifted after an unpredictable number of trials, ranging from 36 to
54. No cues predicted such changes. We refer to a series of trials
occurring between two successive changes as an episode. Without
being instructed, moreover, participants performed two distinct
sessions. In the open session, every episode corresponded to new
stimulus response mappings, whereas in the recurrent session, only
three mappings reoccurred unpredictably; every episode corre-
sponded to one among these three mappings, so that participants
could reuse what they previously learned.
Following episode changes, participants then produced persev-
erative responses (best responses in the preceding episode), correct
responses (best responses in the ongoing episode), or exploratory
responses (neither perseverative nor correct). In both conditions,
correct response rates increased from ,2% at episode onsets to
,90% about 30 trials later (chance level: 25%). Exploratory
response rates increased from ,5% at episode onsets, peaked at
,40% about three or four trials later, and then gradually returned
to ,5% (chance level: 50%) (Figure 1A,B). Thus, in all episodes,
participants maximized pay-offs by learning the associations
between stimuli and correct responses. Critically, correct responses
increased and exploratory responses vanished faster in the
recurrent than open episodes (both ts.3.4, ps,0.005). Thus, in
recurrent episodes, participants retrieved the appropriate associ-
ations they had previously learned, although in the meantime they
learned incongruent associations.
Moreover, we found that in the first trials of recurrent episodes,
a positive feedback caused the production of a correct response in
the next trial even when the two successive stimuli differed.
Frontal Lobe Function and Human Decision-Making
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decisions strongly increased in the first trials of recurrent
compared to open episodes (t=2.8, p=0.012, Figure 1C and
Text S1). In the following trials, by contrast, this mutual
dependence remained weak, approximately constant, and similar
in both recurrent and open episodes (t,1). This finding shows that
in the first trials of recurrent episodes, participants used feedbacks
to retrieve the appropriate stimulus-response mapping rather than
recollecting each stimulus-response association separately. Conse-
quently, participants built and stored multiple stimulus-response
mappings and monitored action outcomes for retrieving previously
learned mappings or learning new ones. This finding further
confirms that the improved performance in the recurrent
compared to open condition could not arise from faster learning
rates in recurrent than open episodes. Indeed, learning rates are
presumed to increase with uncertainty [35,36] and should instead
be faster in open episodes that feature increased uncertainty.
To understand this human ability, we computed for every
participant the models’ parameters that best predict his or her
choice in every trial given his or her previous responses (Figure 2,
legend). As expected, the three models fit participants’ responses
significantly better than a basic RL model adjusting for a single
actor, even when penalizing for increased model complexity
(Figure 2, left). However, neither the fitted FORGET, MAX, nor
RL model accounted for the differential performances observed
between the recurrent and open episodes (Figure 3). Indeed, the
best fitting FORGET model was obtained with bound N=2
(M=2.2; S.E.M.=0.16) and large decay rate Q (M=14%,
S.E.M.=0.9%) relative to the volatility of external contingencies
(3%). This model therefore reduces to a standard UM model
[13,14] that monitors only the actor reliability relative to chance
with no ability to retrieve previously learned mappings. Similarly,
the best fitting MAX model was obtained with bound N=1
(M=1.4; S.E.M.=0.14). This model again monitors only the
actor reliability relative to chance; previously learned mappings
are retrieved only by creating new task sets from strategies stored
in long-term memory with no guidance from action outcomes.
The model therefore fails to account for the increased mutual
dependence of successive decisions made in the first trials of
recurrent episodes (Figure 3).
By contrast, the PROBE model predicts participants’ responses
and their successive dependence in both recurrent and open
episodes (Figure 3). Consistently, the PROBE model fits
participants’ responses significantly better than the other models
(Figure 2, left). The best fitting PROBE model was obtained with
bound N=3 (M=3.3; S.E.M.=0.3); in recurrent episodes,
previously learned mappings are retrieved by selecting the
appropriate task sets according to action outcomes; this explains
the increased dependence of successive decisions made in the first
episode trials. In open episodes, by contrast, new task sets are
created for driving behavior and learning the new mappings, when
facing new external contingencies that cannot be reliably
predicted.
We then tested the hypothesis underlying the PROBE model
that action selection involves a two-stage process: first choosing the
actor task set and then selecting actions within the actor task set.
For that purpose, we considered a variant of the PROBE model
that rules out this hypothesis: actions are directly selected by
marginalizing over task sets on the basis of task sets’ reliability. In
this variant, consistently, concurrent learning occurs for every task
set in proportion to task set reliability. Again, the best fitting
variant was obtained with monitoring bound N=1, so that the
variant becomes equivalent to the best fitting FORGET and MAX
models and similarly fails to account for the differential
Figure 1. Human decisions with no contextual cues. Participants’
performances in recurrent (red) and open (green) episodes plotted
against the number of trials following episode onsets. Shaded areas are
S.E.M. across participants. (A) Correct response rates. (B) Exploratory
response rates. (C) Mutual dependence (i.e., mutual information) of two
successive correct decisions averaged over five-trial sliding bins (see
Text S1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001293.g001
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Thus, the data support the PROBE model assumption that action
selection is based on first choosing the actor task set according to
task set reliability and then selecting actions according to the actor
selective model.
Finally, we compared the PROBE model parameters that best
fit participants’ responses (see Table S1) to those optimizing
PROBE model performance in this protocol. Using computer
simulations, the optimal PROBE model parameters were
computed as those maximizing the proportion of correct responses
produced by the model over both sessions irrespective of
participants’ data (optimal PROBE model performance, 80%;
participants’ performance 6 S.E.M., 77%60.6%). As expected,
optimal bound N was equal to 3, and optimal recollection entropy
g was equal to 1 (the maximal value); because the optimal model is
able to monitor the exact number of recurrent mappings in the
recurrent condition, the recollection of behavioral strategies from
long-term memory becomes useless. As mentioned above, best
fitting bound N averaged across participants was similar to the
optimal value (M=3.3; S.E.M.=0.3). Compared to the optimal
PROBE model, however, participants exhibited lower recollection
entropy g (gbest-fitting 6 S.E.M.=0.7260.07) and positive confir-
mation bias (hoptimal=0;hbest-fitting=0.7460.12). This indicates that
participants retrieved learned behavioral strategies by relying more
on long-term memory recollection than optimally on working
memory retrieval (monitoring buffer). This is consistent with the
fact that in several participants, monitoring bound Ns were lower
than the number of recurrent mappings.
Regarding action selection within task sets, optimal inverse
temperature was large and equal to 30 and optimal noise e equal
to 0. As expected, the optimal model behavior is greedy and most
often selects best rewarding responses. Interestingly, participants
were as greedy as the optimal model behavior with similar best-
fitting inverse temperature b (3262) and virtually zero noise e
(0.0160.003). Optimal and best fitting learning rates of selective
mappingsaswerealsosimilar(as(optimal)=0.4;as(best-fitting)=0.4160.03),
indicating that participants efficiently stored behavioral strategies in
long-term memory.
Human Decisions with Contextual Cues
In a second experiment, we examined whether in the presence
of contextual cues predicting current external contingencies the
PROBE model remains the best predictor of participants’
decisions. Forty-nine additional participants first carried out the
same recurrent session as described above, except that unbeknownst
to them, stimulus colors informed current mappings between
stimuli and best responses. These contextual cues therefore
switched at episode onsets and sometimes within episodes, because
the same mapping could be associated with distinct color cues (see
Figure S2B and Materials and Methods).
In these cued recurrent episodes, participants roughly behaved
as in previous, uncued recurrent episodes (Figure 4A,B). Following
episode changes, however, correct responses increased and
exploratory responses vanished earlier in cued than in uncued
episodes. These effects were even observed in the first episode trial
before the first (adverse) feedback (both ts.4; p,0.001), indicating
that participants used contextual cues to switch behavior
proactively.
Participants then carried out a second session identical to the
first one, except that unbeknownst to them, the session intermixed
three types of cued episodes: control episodes corresponding to cued
recurrent episodes encountered in the first session, transfer episodes
corresponding to such recurrent episodes but associated with new
contextual cues, and open episodes corresponding to new mappings
and contextual cues.
Following episode changes, correct responses increased and
exploratory responses vanished similarly in control and transfer
episodes (both ts,1.5, ps.0.13) but faster and earlier in these
episodes than in open episodes (all ts.4.4, ps,0.001, Figure 4C,D).
Participants therefore performed without using a single ‘‘flat’’
actor directly learning stimulus-cue-response associations. Indeed,
in this case, the performance in transfer episodes would have been
similar to the performance in open rather than control episodes.
For every participant, as described above, we then computed
the models’ parameters that best predict the participants’
responses. Again, the PROBE model was the best fitting model,
Figure 2. Comparison of model fits. Models were fitted using the
standard maximum log-likelihood (LLH) and least squares (LS) methods.
Histograms show the LS and LLH as well as the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) obtained for each model. The LLH method maximizes the
predicted (log-)likelihood of observing actual participants’ responses.
The LS method minimizes the square difference between observed
frequencies and predicted probabilities of correct responses. The
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) alters LLH values according to
model complexity favoring models with less free parameters (Text S1).
Larger LLH, lower LS, and lower BIC values correspond to better fits.
Left, first experiment with no contextual cues. Parameters that cannot
be estimated (i.e., contextual learning rate ac and context-sensitivity
bias d) were removed from the fitting. RL, basic reinforcement learning
model including a single task-set learning stimulus-response association
(free parameters: inverse temperature b, noise e, learning rate as). Right,
second experiment with contextual cues. RL, pure reinforcement
learning model learning a mixture of stimulus-response and stimulus-
cue-response associations (free parameters: inverse temperature b, b9
noise e, learning rates as and ac, and mixture rate v; see Text S1). Note
that in both experiments the PROBE model was the best fitting model
for every fitting criterion (LS, all Fs.3.8, p,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001293.g002
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stimulus-response and stimulus-cue-response associations (Figure 2,
right). Unlike the other models, the PROBE model predicts
participants’ performances in control, transfer, and open episodes
(Figure 5). Moreover, the best fitting PROBE model was again
obtained with bound N=3(M=3.2; S.E.M.=0.3). Other model
parameters were also similar to those obtained in the first
experiment with no contextual cues (mean 6 S.E.M.: recollection
entropy g=0.8460.02; confirmation bias h=0.7160.06; inverse
temperature b=2562; noise e=0.0560.01), except learning rate
as, which was lower (0.1860.1). Compared to the optimal PROBE
model, however, participants exhibited lower contextual learning
rates (ac(optimal)=0.1; ac(best- fitting)=0.00660.002) and large contex-
tual sensitivity bias d (doptimal=0;dbest fitting=0.5560.04). Unlike a
participant, the optimal PROBE model perfectly learns the
associations between contextual cues and behavioral strategies
and uses them to proactively select/retrieve learned behavioral
strategies. The discrepancy is consistent with the fact that in the
model only color cues were implemented as additional stimulus
attributes, whereas participants faced much more contextual
information and were not specifically informed about color cues.
Inter-Individual Variability
Knowing that adaptive behaviors are highly variable and may
even qualitatively differ across individuals [37–39], we examined
inter-individual variability by analyzing separately three groups of
participants identified from post-tests. Post-tests assessed partici-
pants’ ability to recollect the three stimulus-response mappings
they learned in recurrent sessions (Text S1). We found that only
two-thirds of participants recollected the three mappings (13/22
and 34/49 in the first and second experiment, respectively). We
refer to them as exploiting participants and to the remaining third as
exploring participants. Furthermore, in the second experiment, only
half of exploiting participants (19/34) recollected the contextual
cues associated with learned mappings. We refer to them as context-
exploiting participants and to the remaining half (15/34) as outcome-
exploiting participants.
Consistently, in both experiments, exploring participants
behaved without retrieving previously learned stimulus-response
mappings. Unlike exploiting participants, they performed identi-
cally across all episodes (Figures 6 and 7). Conversely, only
context-exploiting participants adjusted faster in control than
transfer episodes (Figure 7), indicating that unlike the others,
Figure 3. Predicted versus observed decisions with no contextual cues. Correct and exploratory response rates as well as mutual
dependences of successive correct decisions in recurrent (red) and open (green) episodes plotted against the number of trials following episode
onsets. Lines 6 error bars (mean 6 S.E.M.): performances predicted by fitted RL, FORGET, MAX, and PROBE models. RL, reinforcement learning model
including a single actor learning stimulus-response associations (details in Figure 2, legend). Correct and exploratory response rates were computed
in every trial according to the actual history of participants’ responses. Mutual dependence of successive correct decisions predicted by each fitted
model was computed as the mutual information between two successive correct responses produced by the model independently of actual
participants’ responses (one simulation for each participant). Stars show significant differences at p,0.05 (mutual dependences on the first eight
trials between recurrent and open episodes. t tests, RL & FORGET, all ts,1. MAX, all ts,2, ps.0.06; PROBE, all ts.3.2, ps,0.004). Lines 6 shaded areas
(mean+S.E.M.): human performances (data from Figure 1). Insets magnify the plots for Trials 7, 8, and 9. See Table S1 for fitted model parameters. See
Text S1 for the discrepancy observed in Trial 5 between participants’ exploratory responses and model predictions (section ‘‘Comments on Model
Fits’’).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001293.g003
Frontal Lobe Function and Human Decision-Making
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retrieving the appropriate mappings. Importantly, these individual
differences were unrelated to possible variations in fatigue,
attention, or motivation across participants. Indeed, in control
and transfer episodes, exploiting participants adjusted faster than
exploring participants, but in open episodes, the opposite was
observed: exploring participants adjusted faster than exploiting
participants (Figure 7, legend). Moreover, no groups ignored
contextual cues as shown in Figure S3.
In every group, the PROBE model precisely predicted
participants’ behavior (Figures 6 and 7) and strikingly remained
the best fitting model (Figure 8). In the best fitting PROBE model,
moreover, exploring participants featured only larger confirmation
biases h than exploiting participants (n=24 versus 34; Mann-
Whitney tests, p,0.001; all other parameters, ps.0.11). Notably,
bounds N and recollection entropy g were similar between the two
groups (M 6 S.E.M.: Nexploring=3.360.3; Nexploiting=3.060.3;
gexploring=77%62%; gexploiting=82%66%). With only larger
confirmation biases, exploring participants appeared simply more
prompt than exploiting participants to accept probe actors they
created especially when episodes changed. Consistent with their
post-test retrieval performances and large recollection entropy,
exploring compared to exploiting participants were thus modeled
as re-learning from scratch rather than retrieving the stimulus-
response mappings they had previously learned.
By contrast, context- compared to outcome-exploiting partici-
pants featured only larger context-sensitivity biases d, larger contextual
learning rates aC (M=1.1% versus 0.4%) and slightly lower
recollection entropy g (M=77%63% versus 86%62%) (Mann-
Withney tests, all ps,0.025; all other parameters, ps.0.1). Again,
bound N was virtually identical in the two groups (N=3.474 versus
3.467, S.E.M.s=0.4). With larger context-sensitivity biases, context-
compared to outcome-exploiting participants appeared more
prompt to switch behavior whenever contextual cues shifted. In
this protocol, this bias along with slightly lower recollection
entropy strongly favored the learning of contextual models,
because cue changes were most often associated with episode
changes. Consistent with their post-test retrieval performances,
outcome-exploiting participants were thus modeled as learning
more efficiently the associations between contextual cues and
stimulus-response mappings.
Discussion
We found that the best account of human decisions is the
PROBE model combining forward Bayesian inference for
evaluating task set reliability and choosing the most reliable actor
set and hypothesis-testing for possibly creating new task sets when
facing ambiguous or unknown situations. Relaxing successively
these assumptions, namely hypothesis-testing (MAX model), task
set creation (FORGET model), and reliability monitoring (pure
RL models), fails to account for human decisions. In contrast to
these alternative models, the PROBE model predicts human
decisions and its variations across individuals in recurrent or open-
Figure 4. Human decisions with contextual cues. Participants’ performances are plotted against the number of trials following episode onsets.
Shaded areas are S.E.M. across participants. (A and B) Correct and exploratory response rates in uncued (red) and cued (blue) recurrent episodes.
Uncued recurrent episodes are from Experiment 1 for participants who performed the recurrent session before the open session (half of participants).
Cued recurrent episodes correspond to the first session of the second experiment. (C and D) Correct and exploratory response rates in control (blue),
transfer (orange), and open (green) episodes (second experiment, second session). In control episodes, the drop of correct response rates and the
peak of exploratory response rates visible on Trial 29 corresponded to contextual cue changes while external contingencies remained unchanged
(see Figure S3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001293.g004
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associated with contextual cues.
Critically, the PROBE model estimates the ‘‘absolute’’ reliabil-
ity of task sets and consequently involves binary decision-making for
selecting actors, even when multiple task sets are monitored in
parallel. Indeed, actor selection is based on a ‘‘satisficing’’ criterion
based on task set reliability [1]: either a task set appears to be
reliable, in which case it becomes the actor, because no other task
sets meet this criterion, or no task set appears reliable, in which
case a new task set is created and serves as an actor (Materials and
Methods). The results thus show that human executive control
(i.e., task set selection) involves binary decisions based on task set
reliability. This finding contrasts with action selection within task
sets, which in agreement with previous studies [28] involves multi-
valued decisions based on (soft-) maximizing expected utility of
actions.
The PROBE model further indicates that in both experiments
participants’ performances relied on forming and monitoring at
most three or four task sets in parallel. This capacity was
independent of individual differences in retrieving task sets but
might reflect the number of stimulus-response mappings used in
recurrent sessions (i.e., three). To examine this possibility, we fit
the PROBE model on participants’ performances in open sessions
only, which include no recurrent episodes. Again, we found that
the best fitting PROBE model was obtained with monitoring
bound N equal to three or four task sets (M=3.4, S.E.M.=0.5,
with no significant differences between open sessions performed
first and second: N=2.960.6; N=4.060.8; Mann-Whitney test,
p.0.46). This capacity therefore appears to be independent of the
protocol structure. Furthermore, we conducted an additional
experiment with 30 additional participants that consisted of a
recurrent session identical to that used in Experiment 1, except
that four recurrent mappings between stimuli and correct responses
reoccurred pseudo-randomly across episodes. We found that the
best fitting monitoring bound N was virtually identical to that
found in Experiments 1 and 2 (M=3.4, S.E.M.=0.3) (Figure S4,
legend). Thus, monitoring bound N was essentially unaltered by
the amount of information stored in long-term memory (selective
and predictive mappings). In this session, moreover, participants
performed as in open episodes (Figure S4), indicating that, on
average, participants monitored no more than three task sets.
Altogether, the results provide evidence that, on average, the
monitoring capacity of human executive function (also referred to
as procedural working-memory [23,24]) is limited to three
concurrent behavioral strategies (four with probe actors). We note
that this limit also matches that previously proposed for human
declarative working memory [22].
Despite this monitoring capacity, the binary structure of
executive control in the PROBE model predicts that humans
can flexibly switch back and forth between two task sets but with
more difficulty across three or more task sets. Indeed, when only
one task set is monitored along with the actor and with no
evidence that none fit external contingencies, then the unreliability
of the actor implies the reliability of the other task set and,
consequently, its selection as an actor (Materials and Methods). In
the other cases, however, especially when two or more task sets are
monitored along with the actor, the unreliability of the actor does
not imply the reliability of another one. In that event, a new actor
is created and probed until additional evidence will possibly reveal
the reliability of another task set and the rejection of the probe
actor. This prediction is consistent with previous studies showing
that humans are impaired in switching back and forth across three
compared to two task sets, irrespective of working memory load
[40]. According to the present results, this impairment reflects the
Figure 5. Predicted versus observed decisions with contextual cues. Correct and exploratory response rates in control (blue), transfer
(orange), and open (green) episodes plotted against the number of trials following episode onsets. Lines 6 error bars (mean 6 S.E.M.): performances
predicted by fitted RL, FORGET, MAX, and PROBE models in every trial according to the actual history of participants’ responses. The RL model
includes a single actor learning a mixture of stimulus-response and stimulus-cue-response associations (see Figure 2 legend for details). Lines
6shaded areas (mean+S.E.M.): human performances (data from Figure 4C,D). See Table S1 for fitted model parameters. Note the systematic
discrepancies between the predictions from RL, FORGET, and MAX models and human data.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001293.g005
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executive control.
It is worth noting that with monitoring bound N equal to three
(or more), both the FORGET and MAX models qualitatively
account for the differential performances and dependences of
successive responses we observed between recurrent and open
episodes. However, these differential effects result not only from
increased performances in recurrent episodes but mostly from
dramatic decreased performances in open episodes; both models
become much more perseverative than human participants in
open episodes. As shown in the Results section, both models
actually reach human performances in open episodes only by
monitoring a single actor task set against chance or ‘‘random
behavior’’ (which is obtained in the FORGET model through
large decay rate Q), thereby reproducing the binary control
inherent to the PROBE model. In contrast to the PROBE model,
however, they consequently fail to properly account for the
differential performances observed between recurrent and open
conditions. This provides further evidence that the binary
structure of task set selection combined with the monitoring of
alternative task sets are critical components of human executive
function.
Accordingly, human executive function monitors up to three or
four task sets and, when one appears reliable, selects it for driving
behavior. Otherwise, the executive function directly creates a new
task set and probes it as an actor rather than exploiting only the
collection of behavioral strategies associated with current task sets.
The probe actor forms a new strategy that recombines previously
learned strategies stored in long-term memory and collected
according to external cues (given contextual mappings). We found
that recollection entropy was large (.0.7), indicating that task set
creation especially prompts exploratory (random) behavior, at least
when no stored strategies are specifically cued by contextual
signals. In the converse case, task set creation comes to re-
instantiate such externally cued strategies from long-term memory
for driving behavior, even when they are not associated with
current task sets. However, the PROBE model further assumes
that task set creation is tested; probe actors may be discarded
when, despite learning, other task sets become reliable before such
probe actors. The results therefore reveal two fundamentally
distinct human exploration processes: first, uncontrolled exploration
stochastically selecting actions within actor task sets according to a
softmax policy for learning behavioral strategies that maximize
action utility [3,28,41], and second, controlled exploration occurring
whenever no task sets appear reliable for investigating the
opportunity to re-instantiate behavioral strategies stored in long-
term memory or to learn new ones depending upon contextual
cues.
For the sake of simplicity, the model described herein assumes
that no internal alterations of action outcome utility (e.g.,
devaluation due to satiety) have occurred when task sets are
created from behavioral strategies collected from long-term
memory. Consistently, no alterations of outcome utility were
induced in the present experimental protocol. To further account
for possible utility alterations, selective mappings that encode
action utility in behavioral strategies need to be recalibrated
according to the current utility of action outcomes when new task
sets are created. As previously proposed [42,43], this internal
recalibration is achieved through model-based reinforcement
learning before experiencing actual action outcomes; using
predictive mappings embedded in behavioral strategies for
anticipating action outcomes, associated selective mappings are
altered according to current outcome utility through standard
reinforcement learning [11].
Figure 6. Individual differences in decision-making with no
contextual cues. Correct and exploratory response rates as well as
mutual dependence of successive correct decisions in recurrent (red)
and open (green) episodes plotted against the number of trials
following episode onsets (data from Experiment 1). Lines 6 shaded
areas (mean+S.E.M.): participants’ performances. Lines 6 error bars
(mean 6 S.E.M.): predicted performances from the fitted PROBE model.
Predicted correct and exploratory response rates were computed in
every trial according to the actual history of participants’ responses.
Predicted mutual dependence of successive correct decisions was
computed as the mutual information between two successive correct
responses produced by the model independently of actual participants’
responses (one simulation for each participant). Left, exploiting
participants: Correct responses increased and exploratory responses
vanished faster in recurrent than open episodes (Wilcoxon-test, both
zs.2.8, ps,0.005). Right, exploring participants: performances were
similar in recurrent and open episodes (correct and exploratory
responses: Wilcoxon-test, both zs,1.4, ps.0.17). See Table S2 for fitted
model parameters in each group. See Text S1 for the discrepancy
observed in Trial 5 between exploiting participants’ exploratory
responses and model predictions in recurrent episodes (section ‘‘Data
Analyses’’).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001293.g006
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involves model-based reinforcement learning based on action
outcome predictions, while task set execution involves model-free
reinforcement learning based on actual action outcomes. The
hypothesis is consistent with empirical findings: in extinction
paradigms suppressing actual action outcomes following training,
differential outcome devaluations were found to impact action
selection (e.g., [42,44]). In the PROBE model, suppressing actual
action outcomes consistently triggers task set creation because the
ongoing actor task set becomes unreliable. In the context of the
experiment, then, task set creation comes to re-instantiate and
recalibrate the learned behavioral strategy for acting (see above);
its predictive mapping recalibrates the associated selective
mapping according to actual outcome utility. Moreover, as
adjustments to external contingencies may be faster for predictive
than selective mappings (Bayesian updating versus reinforcement
learning, respectively), this hypothesis may also account for
contrasted devaluation effects occurring after moderate versus
extensive training [45]. Thus, the PROBE model predicts that
model-based reinforcement learning is involved in forming a new
behavioral strategy when ongoing behavior and habit formation
driven by model-free reinforcement learning become unreliable.
Interestingly, the prediction differs from previous accounts
assuming that the arbitration between behavioral strategies driven
by model-free versus model-based reinforcement learning is based
on their relative reliability [43].
We assumed that task sets represent behavior strategies comprising
selective mappings encoding stimulus-response associations according
to action utility, predictive mappings encoding expected action
outcomes given stimuli, and contextual mappings encoding external
cues predicting task set reliability. Neuroimaging studies suggest that
these internal mappings are implemented in distinct frontal regions: (1)
selective mappings in lateral premotor regions, because these regions
are involved in learning and processing stimulus-response associations
[10,46]; (2) predictive mappings in ventromedial prefrontal regions,
because these regions are engaged in learning and processing expected
and actual action outcomes [47–50]; and (3) contextual mappings in
lateral prefrontal regions, because these regions are involved in learning
and selecting task sets according to contextual cues [10,46,51].
Neuroimaging studies further show that dorsomedial prefrontal regions
evaluate the discrepancies between actual and predicted action
outcomes [17,52] and estimate the volatility of external contingencies
[14]. The PROBE model thus suggests that dorsomedial prefrontal
regions monitor task set reliability according to predictive mappings
implemented in ventromedial prefrontal regions and volatility
estimates. Lateral prefrontal regions then revise task set reliability
Figure 7. Individual differences in decision-making with contextual cues. Correct and exploratory response rates in control (blue), transfer
(orange), and open (green) episodes plotted against the number of trials following episode onsets (data from Experiment 2). Lines 6 shaded areas
(mean+S.E.M.): participants’ performances. Lines 6 error bars (mean 6 S.E.M.): performances predicted by the fitted PROBE model in every trial
according to the actual history of participants’ responses. Left, context-exploiting participants: Correct responses increased and exploratory responses
vanished faster in control than transfer episodes (Wilcoxon-tests, both zs.2.4, ps,0.015) and faster in transfer than open episodes (Wilcoxon-tests,
both zs.3.1, ps,0.002). Middle, outcome-exploiting participants: performances were similar in control and transfer episodes (correct and exploratory
responses: Wilcoxon-tests, both zs,1.4, ps.0.15), but correct responses increased and exploratory responses vanished faster in transfer than open
episodes (Wilcoxon-tests, both zs.2.3, ps,0.023). Right, exploring participants: performances were similar in control, transfer, and open episodes
(correct and exploratory responses: Friedmann-tests, both x
2,5.3, ps.0.07). Note that in open episodes, exploring participants adjusted faster than
exploiting participants (correct responses: both ts.3.0, ps,0.004). See Table S2 for fitted model parameters in each group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001293.g007
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immediate behavior (i.e., the selective mapping in the premotor cortex
that specifies the responses to stimuli) [46].
The present study suggests that the prefrontal cortex monitors at
most three or four task sets. The frontal network described above
selects the unique task set appearing reliable for driving behavior
and adjusts it according to action outcomes. When none appear
reliable, this frontal network presumably enters in controlled
exploration; a new task set is probed but initially appears
unreliable, thereby requiring an additional control system to
enforce or discard this probe actor. This system needs to monitor
at least the second most reliable task set. When both the actor and
its best alternative appear unreliable (or no alternative sets are
monitored), the system enforces exploration; a new task set is
created from long-term memory in the frontal network described
above and drives behavior. Exploration then terminates when
either this probe actor or its current best alternative becomes
reliable. This putative system matches the function attributed to
frontopolar regions, usually referred to as cognitive branching
[53,54]: enabling the unexpected execution of a task, while
holding on and monitoring an alternative task for possible future
execution. Furthermore, consistent with the notion of controlled
exploration, frontopolar regions are engaged in exploratory
behavior [28], long-term memory cued retrieval [55], and in the
early phase of learning new behaviors [50,56]. The PROBE model
thus predicts that frontopolar regions monitor at least the
reliability of the best alternative to the actor, a prediction
supported by recent neuroimaging evidence [47,57]. Finally, we
found that individual variations in adaptive behavior primarily
result from confirmation biases in controlled exploration. Consis-
tently, the frontopolar function has been associated with individual
variations in fluid intelligence [58], suggesting that fluid intelli-
gence is associated with the ability to probe new strategies.
According to previous studies, ‘‘creativity is the epitome of
cognitive flexibility. The ability to break conventional or obvious
patterns of thinking, adopt new and/or higher order rules and
think conceptually and abstractly is at the heart of any theory of
creativity’’ ([59]; see also [60]). From this perspective, the PROBE
model that flexibly builds task sets as abstract mental constructs
referring to true or hypothetical ‘‘states of the world’’ for exploring
and storing new behavioral rules may help us to understand
creative processes underlying human adaptive behavior. In
particular, the distinction mentioned above between uncontrolled
and controlled exploration is similar to the distinction made in
artificial intelligence between exploratory creativity (generating
new low-level actions/objects) and transformational creativity
(generating new higher level rules) [61,62]. Critically, the PROBE
model suggests how the human executive function regulates the
exploration versus exploitation of behavioral rules and controls
creativity in the service of adaptive behavior.
In summary, the results support a model of frontal lobe function
integrating reasoning, learning, and creative abilities in the service
of executive control and decision-making. The model suggests how
the frontal lobes create and manage an expanding repertoire of
Figure 8. Comparison of model fits according to individual differences. Least square residuals (LS), maximal log-likelihoods (LLH), and
Bayesian information criteria (BIC) obtained for each model in exploring versus exploiting participants (left) and in context- versus outcome-
exploiting participants (right). RL, reinforcement learning; F, FORGET; M, MAX; P, PROBE model. See details in the Figure 2 legend. Note that in every
participants’ group, the PROBE model was the best fitting model for every fitting criterion (LS, all Fs.4.2, ps,0.001 in exploiting and exploring
groups; Wilcoxon tests in context- and outcome-exploiting groups, all zs.2.0, ps,0.047).
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001293.g008
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changing, and open-ended environments.
Materials and Methods
PROBE Model
To model uncertain, variable, and open-ended environments,
we assumed that in every trial t, there were external contingen-
cies—that is, the possibly stochastic relationships between stimulus
st, action at, and outcomes ot depend upon a hidden state TS 
t only.
Hidden states are countable, potentially infinite, and vary across
trials independently of stimuli and actions. Stimulus st may be
multidimensional and might include cues about current hidden
states, which we refer to as contextual cues for clarity. Hidden state
TS 
t is assumed to depend only upon the preceding hidden state
TS 
t{1 (Markov property) and contextual cues Ct to depend only
upon current hidden state TS 
t .
We describe below the PROBE model computations. In Text
S1, we present the statistical normative approach to the problem
of task set creation based on Dirichlet Processes (see also Figure
S5) and how the PROBE model approximates this statistical
optimal model for the sake of biological plausibility.
Task sets. Task sets TSi represent possible instances of external
hidden states. Each task set i indexes one strategy stored in long-term
memory and comprises (1) a selective mapping Qi(s,a)~E(r½o  s,a, j
TS ~TSi:) encoding expected rewarding values r[o]o fo u t c o m e so
given action a and stimulus s;( 2 )apredictive mapping ci(o,s,a)~
P(os ,a, TS ~TSi j ) encoding the likelihood of outcome o given
action a and stimulus s;a n d( 3 )acontextual mapping F(iC j )~
P(TS ~TSi C j ) encoding the likelihood that hidden state TS*
matches TSi when contextual cues C are observed (Figure S1).
Reliability. We assumed that the executive system monitors
the reliability of at most N task sets. Reliability of task set TSi is the
likelihood that in trial t, external hidden state TS 
t matches TSi
given observations. In every trial, task set reliability is estimated in
two time points: (1) before acting when stimulus st, possibly
including contextual cues Ct, is observed, and (2) after action when
action outcome ot is further observed. We refer to these two
reliability estimates as ex-ante reliability li(t) and ex-post reliability
mi(t), respectively. Thus, li(t) and mi(t) write as follows:
li(t)~P(TS 
t ~TSi Ct j , past)
mi(t)~P(TS 
t ~TSi ot,Ct j , past),
ð1Þ
where past refers to all other observations, including those from
preceding trials. The PROBE model estimates the ‘‘absolute’’
reliability of task sets (i.e., the likelihood that hidden state TS 
t
matches TSi conditionally upon observations but not upon the
collection of current task sets). Such estimates require computing
the likelihood that hidden state TS 
t actually matches no task sets
TSi. As task set reliability, this likelihood can be estimated before
acting and after action. These two estimates are denoted as l0(t)
and m0(t), respectively, and write as follows:
l0(t)~P(TS 
t 6[f1,:::,Ntg Ct j , past)
m0(t)~P(TS 
t 6[f1,:::,Ntg ot j , Ct,past),
ð2Þ
where Nt is the current number of task sets (Nt#N) and {1,…, Nt}
denotes the current collection of task sets.
Note that uniform predictive mapping c0 corresponding to
random predictions over action outcomes is actually an estimate of
P(ot TS 
t 6[f1,:::,Ntg, past
    ). Indeed, all outcomes observed with
the current collection of task sets remain equally probable, when
hidden state TS 
t is unknown. Consequently, mapping c0 is
constant and normalized according to the number of observed
outcomes: c0~1=Noutcomes, where Noutcomes counts outcomes o such
that
P
i[ 1:::Nt fg
P
s,a
ci(o,s,a)w0 (e.g., Noutcomes~
P
r
sigmoid½r
P
i[ 1:::Nt fg P
s,a
ci(o,s,a)  with large inverse temperature r).
For clarity, we denote TS 
t ~TS0 theevent TS 
t 6[f1,:::,Ntg.
Consequently, we can write the following using Equations 1 and 2:
P(TS 
t ~TSi past j )
~
X
j[f0,1,:::,Ntg
P(TS 
t~TSi TS 
t{1~TSj)
    P(TS 
t{1~TSj past) j
~
X
j[f0,1,:::,Ntg
tijmj(t{1),
ð3Þ
where tij are transition probabilities from states j to i. Using
standard Bayesian calculus and assuming that with no observa-
tions all task sets are presumed equally reliable (i.e., P(TS 
t ~TSi)
is independent of i), we then obtain from Equation 3 the following
updating rule for ex-ante reliability:
li(t) ~
F(iC t) j
P
j[ 0,1,...,Nt fg tijmj(t{1)
Zl
t
, ð4Þ
where indexes i[f0,1,:::,Ntg and Zl
t is the normalization term.
Finally, we obtain the following updating rule for ex-post
reliability:
mi(t) ~
ci(ot,st,at)li(t)
Z
m
t
, ð5Þ
where indexes i[f0,1,...,Ntg and Z
m
t is the normalization term.
Finally, transition probabilities tij reflect the perceived volatility t
of hidden states (external contingencies) across successive trials:
typically tii~1{t, ti=j~
t
Nt{1
, with 0,t,1 and Nt the
current number of task sets. As previously proposed [14], volatility
t is estimated using a standard hidden Markov model.
Task set selection and creation. As described above, the
PROBE model estimates the ‘‘absolute’’ reliability of task sets.
Consequently, a minimal requirement is that the actor task set is
more likely reliable than unreliable (i.e., lactor(t).12lactor(t)o r
equivalently, lactor(t).0.5). If a task set meets this reliability
criterion, it is necessarily unique, the most reliable one, and
therefore used as the actor. The criterion is necessarily fulfilled
when only two task sets are monitored and l0(t) is close to zero. In
the other cases, the criterion is highly restrictive, so that no task
sets may meet the criterion. In that case, a new task set is created
to serve as an actor with prior reliability lprior.
The new task set is created with initial selective/predictive
mappings Mnew forming a mixture of all selective/predictive
mappings stored in long-term memory and weighted according to
contextual cues Ct:
Mnew~gUz(1{g)
P
k
F(kC t j )Mk
Z
, ð6Þ
where U denotes uniform mappings, Mnew and Mk are selective/
predictive mappings, and Z~
P
k
FkC t j ðÞ is the normalization
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term memory and g scales recollection entropy (0,g,1), as uniform
mappings U reflect recollection noise. Note that internal mappings
with distinct index k may encode the same external contingencies;
mixture (Equation 6) thus favors external contingencies that
frequently re-occur. Given the approximations inherent to the
PROBE model, more precisely, mixture (Equation 6) derives from
the statistical optimal model based on Dirichlet processes (see Text
S1). The mixture forms a new probe actor that is adjusted in
subsequent trials through learning.
Prior reliability lprior of the probe actor is chosen as minimizing
prior information over task set reliability because no information is
available to estimate it [32]. Thus, prior reliability lprior maximizes
entropy Ht over reliability; that is:
Ht~{lprior loglprior{
X
j[ 1,:::,Nt fg lj(t)(1{lprior)loglj(t)(1{lprior):
ð7Þ
Maximal entropy Ht is then obtained for:
lprior~ 1zexpht ðÞ
{1, ð8Þ
where ht~{
P
j[ 1,:::,Nt fg lj(t)loglj(t) is the reliability entropy
over task sets. We can verify that prior reliability lprior ranges
between 1/(Nt+1) and 1/3, so that this new actor initially fails to
meet the reliability criterion (i.e., lprior#0.5).
Consequently, the new actor is probed because it initially fails to
meet the reliability criterion. When another task set subsequently
meets the criterion while the probe actor still fails, the latter will be
entirely discarded. When, conversely, learning allows the probe
actor to meet the criterion while the others still fail, the probe
phase terminates and the collection of task sets is updated as
described in the main text. Note that this model favors binary
compared to multiple alternative choices, because the reliability
criterion is automatically fulfilled only when two task sets are
monitored (and l0(t)<0; that is, the likelihood that none matches
external contingencies is close to zero).
Overall, the PROBE model is an online, forward approxima-
tion of Dirichlet process mixtures [19] based on hypothesis testing
on task set creation (that is, on the critical no-parametric
component of Dirichlet processes; see Text S1). Hidden states
TS 
t are provisionally assigned to new task sets as long as no task
sets meet the reliability criterion. Conversely, hidden states are
definitively assigned to task sets only when task sets meet the
reliability criterion. Thus, provisional versus definitive assignments
occur precisely when, in optimal statistical learning, offline
backward inference is likely versus unlikely to alter previous
assignments, respectively.
Action selection and learning. Ex-ante reliabilities li(t)
serve to choose the actor. The actor selective mapping then
determines the behavioral policy P(at|st) (i.e., the probability to
select action at in response to stimulus st based on an e-softmax
with inverse temperature b):
P(at st j )~(1{e)
expbQactor(st,at)
P
a~1:::na
expbQactor(st,a)
z
e
na
, ð9Þ
where na is the number of available actions and Qactor(st,at) are
normalized to 1 over actions (not shown in Equation 9 for clarity).
After observing action outcome ot, the actor selective mapping is
updated based on outcome values r[o] according to standard
reinforcement learning mechanisms [11] (e.g., the simple delta rule
[31]): Qtz1
actor(st,at)~as rtz(1{as)Qt
actor(st,at), where as is the
learning rate. The actor predictive mapping simply regularizes
action outcome likelihood given stimulus [13]. Contextual
mappings F(i|Ct) of every task set then adjust to ex-post
estimates of reliability according to a standard stochastic
gradient descent: Ftz1(iC t j )~ac mi(t)z(1{ac)Ft(iC t j ), where
ac is the learning rate.
Context-sensitivity bias. Whenever, besides regular stimuli,
additional external cues change between two successive trials,
participants might infer that external contingencies (i.e., hidden
external states) more likely shift between these trials than others.
To account for this possible bias, we considered that in every
model, perceived volatility t’ of external contingencies between
such trials might be enhanced: t’~tzd, where free parameter
d$0 is named context-sensitivity bias.
Confirmation bias. Participants might be reluctant to
unselect a newly created actor set for returning to another task
set. We then considered that prior reliability lprior of such actors
might be biased:
lbiased prior~h|0:5z(1{h)lprior, ð10Þ
where free parameter h is named confirmation bias (0.5 is used in
Equation 10 for consistency with the creation threshold).
Alternative models. See Text S1.
Experimental Protocol
Participants. Participants were healthy, right-handed
volunteers (age range, 18–35 years old) with no auditory and vision
deficits and no general medical,neurological, psychiatric, or addictive
history as assessed by medical examinations. Participants provided
written informed consent approved by the French National Ethics
Committee. Participants were paid for their participation.
Experimental set-up and instructions. Stimuli were
visually presented arabic numbers. Participants responded to each
stimulus by pressing one of four keys (Figure S2). The keys were
assigned to the index and middle finger of each hand. When key
presses occurred no later than 1,500 ms after stimulus onset, stimuli
disappeared 100 ms after key presses and participants received
audiovisual feedbacks (duration 300 ms). Feedbacks were positive or
negative. A positive feedback consisted of an ascending sound and
the apparition of the associated stimulus in a box representing the
pressed key at the bottom of the screen. Negative feedback consisted
ofadescending sound only.Otherwise,stimuliwereremoved andno
feedback was delivered. Stimulus onset asynchrony was 2,000 ms.
Associations between actual stimuli, response fingers, and feedbacks
were orthorgonalized and counterbalanced across participants.
Participants were instructed that feedback could be uncertain
and variable and that payoffs increased with the total number of
received positive feedback. No additional instructions were
provided to participants.
Experiment 1. Experiment 1 included 22 participants (13
females). Unbeknownst to the participants, we made the following
manipulations: In every trial, a ‘‘correct’’ response was associated
with each stimulus (three possible stimuli) and led to positive
feedback with a probability of 90%. All other responses led to
negative feedback with a probability of 90%. Distinct stimuli were
associated with distinct correct responses. Correct responses to
stimuli remained unchanged over a series of successive trials,
ranging from 36 to 54, named episodes. All correct responses to
stimuli changed between two successive episodes.
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on 2 separate days. Each session included 25 episodes. Stimuli
were pseudo-randomly chosen from the set ({1,3,5} for one session
or {2,4,6} for the other session). In the open session, the mappings
between stimuli and best responses never repeated across 24
episodes. In the last episode, the mapping from the first episode
was used again, because from three stimuli and four possible
responses only 24 distinct mappings can be formed (with the
constraint that two distinct stimuli are associated with distinct
responses). Although the mappings were distinct, there were
considerable overlaps across the mappings. Every stimulus-
response association belongs to six distinct mappings, while every
pair of stimulus-response associations belongs to four distinct
mappings. In order to properly define episode onsets, mappings
were further organized across episodes so that there were no
overlaps between two successive mappings. In the recurrent session,
only three distinct mappings reoccurred over the episodes in a
pseudo-randomized order (8/8/9 repetitions). The three mappings
did not overlap (i.e., best responses to stimuli systematically
differed across mappings). Transition probabilities were equalized
across mappings.
Finally, episode and session order were counterbalanced across
participants. Episode durations were pseudo-randomized and
ranged from 36 to 54 trials, so that on average volatility of external
contingencies was identical in the open and recurrent sessions
(3%).
Experiment 2. Experiment 2 included 49 additional
participants (25 females) and comprised two behavioral sessions
administered on 2 consecutive days. Again, participants were not
informed about the following manipulations. Stimuli were pseudo-
randomly chosen from the set {1,2,3}. The first session was
identical to the recurrent session described above with only one
exception: stimulus colors predicted the mappings between stimuli
and best responses used in each episode with 100% reliability.
Two mappings were associated with unique color cues. The third
one was associated with two possible color cues for assessing the
effects of cue changes without episode changes (an event occurring
at most once in such episodes).
The second session included 13 rehearsal episodes correspond-
ing to the cued recurrent episodes used in the first session followed
by 12 intermixed test episodes: four control episodes corresponding
to the recurrent mapping associated with its two color cues, six
transfer episodes corresponding to the two other recurrent
mappings but now associated with new color cues, and two open
episodes corresponding to a new mapping associated with new
cues. All these mappings were fully incongruent; there were only
four possible instances of such mappings, which were used in these
12 episodes. Order of episodes was counterbalanced across
participants.
Data analyses, model fitting, and post-tests. See Text S1.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Architecture of task sets. The monitoring buffer
comprises a limited number of task sets, each indexing a
behavioral strategy stored in long-term memory and comprising
a selective, predictive, and contextual mapping (M). The reliability
of each task set is monitored online at two time points: right before
acting (ex-ante reliability li) and right after perceiving action
outcomes (ex-post reliability mi); ex-ante reliability li is inferred
from ex-post reliability in the preceding trial according to
contextual cues C (given contextual models) and the perceived
volatility of external contingencies (not shown); ex-post reliability
mi is inferred from ex-ante reliability preceding action according to
action outcomes r (given predictive models). Ex-ante reliability
serves to choose the actor driving immediate behavior. The actor
selective mapping then determines the responses to stimuli. Actor
selective and predictive mappings learn according to action
outcomes. Contextual mappings of task sets adjust to ex-post
reliability and consequently learn contextual cues C predicting task
set reliability. Red indicates computations occurring within the
actor set only. Arrows indicate information flows occurring within
task sets. Broken arrows symbolize learning processes within
internal mappings (M). Blue lines represent the associations
remaining between internal mappings forming strategies stored
in long-term memory and previously indexed by a task set. See
Materials and Methods for notations.
(PDF)
Figure S2 Trial structure in Experiments 1 and 2. (A) First
experiment. Visual stimuli were pseudo-randomly drawn from a
set of three arabic numbers (e.g., (1, 3, 5)). Participants had to
respond by pressing one among four possible response keys.
100 ms after participants’ responses, stimuli were removed and
positive or negative feedback was presented during 300 ms;
positive feedback consisted of an ascending sound and stimuli
appeared in a box at the bottom of the screen corresponding to the
pressed key. Negative feedback consisted of descending sounds
only. Stimulus onset asynchrony was 2,000 ms. (B) Second
experiment. Same as Experiment 1, except that stimuli appeared
in different colors. Unbeknownst to participants, stimuli colors
were contextual cues associated with the different possible
mappings between stimuli and best rewarding responses occurring
across the experiment. Color cues changed infrequently. The
figure shows the only events and external signals participants could
observe in the experiments. In particular, participants had to infer
any other information regarding external contingencies, including
the associations between stimuli, color cues, response keys and
feedback, their occurrence structure, uncertainty, and variations in
the experiment.
(PDF)
Figure S3 Irrelevant contextual changes within episodes. Left,
proportions of correct responses produced by context-, outcome-
exploiting, and exploring participants on trials preceding and
following changes in contextual cues within control episodes
(Experiment 2). Contextual cues changed in Trial T, whereas the
mapping between stimuli and best responses remained unchanged.
Error bars are S.E.M. across participants. Right, proportions of
correct responses predicted by the PROBE model for each
group with parameters fitted on every participant. In every trial,
predicted proportions are computed according to actual
participants’ responses in previous trials. Error bars are S.E.M.
across participants. The model predicts that, in every group,
correct responses drop off in Trial T (decreases from Trial T-1 to
T, F=6.7, p,0.001; interaction with groups, F,1). In every
group, consistently, participants’ correct responses dropped off in
Trial T (decreases from Trial T-1 to T, main effect, F.4.9,
p,0.001; interaction with groups, F,1). This result shows that in
every group, participants were responsive to contextual cues as
predicted by the PROBE model.
(PDF)
Figure S4 Human performances and PROBE model fit with
four recurrent action sets. Shaded lines, performances from 30
healthy participants (16 females, aged 18–30 years old) in
recurrent episodes plotted against the number of trials following
episode onset. Shaded areas are S.E.M. across participants
(detailed legend in Figure 1). The experimental session consisted
of 24 recurrent episodes identical to that from Experiment 1 (see
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responses re-occurred pseudo-randomly across episodes. The four
mappings were fully incongruent. Note that participants per-
formed as in open episodes in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1) with no
peaks of mutual dependence of successive decisions in the first
trials of episodes. Lines 6 error bars (mean 6 S.E.M.),
performances predicted by the fitted PROBE model (details in
Figure 2): correct and exploratory response rates were computed
in every trial according to the actual history of participants’
responses. Mutual dependence of successive correct decisions
predicted by the model was computed as the mutual information
between two successive correct decisions produced by the model
independently of actual participants’ responses (one simulation for
each participant). Best-fitting model parameters (mean(S.E.M.)):
inverse temperature b=35(2.3); noise e=0.04(.003); bound
N=3.4(.3); learning rate a=0.34(.04); recollection entropy
g=0.75(.03); and confirmation bias h=0.34(.06). Note that the
parameters are close to those from Experiment 1 (see Table S1).
See Text S1 (section ‘‘Comments on Model Fits’’) for additional
comments regarding model and participants’ behavior.
(PDF)
Figure S5 Performance of the statistical optimal model. Graphs
show the best achievable performance in terms of information
processing in Experiment 1. The statistical optimal model is
described in Text S1, 1-Normative approach to the PROBE
model, optimal statistical model. Red, recurrent episodes; green,
open episodes. The best achievable performance is obtained with
inferences involving at least 25 trials backwards and concentration
parameter g=10. Lower concentration parameters improve
model performance in recurrent episodes (increased correct
responses and decreased exploratory responses), but decrease
model performance in open episodes. Conversely, larger concen-
tration parameters decrease model performance in recurrent
episodes but improve model performance in open episodes. Inset,
human data from Figure 1 (see Figure 1 for detailed legend). In
both conditions, as expected, the statistical optimal model
outperforms human participants dramatically.
(PDF)
Table S1 Best fitting model parameters used in Figures 3 and 5.
Mean(S.E.M.) across participants. See Materials and Methods for
detailed parameter description.
(PDF)
Table S2 Best fitting parameters in the PROBE model across
participants’ group used in Figures 6 and 7. Mean(S.E.M.) across
participants. See Materials and Methods for detailed parameter
description. Boxes indicate significant differences across groups
(see text).
(PDF)
Text S1 Supplementary methods.
(PDF)
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